The Town of Seabrook has released its 2025 annual Water and Sewer System Reports, providing residents and ratepayers with an overview of operational performance and financial results for both utility systems.
These reports continue the Town’s effort to provide clear annual reporting on enterprise utility operations, including system usage, revenues, operational trends, and future financial obligations.
Highlights from the 2025 reports include:
Water Fund revenue of approximately $3.44 million, exceeding budget projections.
Sewer Fund revenue of approximately $3.57 million, also exceeding budget projections.
Continued stable operations across both systems.
Identification of key operational focus areas, including water loss reduction and continued management of sewer infiltration and inflow (I&I).
Discussion of major infrastructure investments and the impact of new debt service obligations beginning in Fiscal Year 2026.
While 2025 reflects strong financial performance in both enterprise systems, the reports note that significant capital investments in water and sewer infrastructure will materially increase annual debt service beginning in 2026.
The Town believes transparent reporting is important as these utility systems continue to operate as fully enterprise-funded services.
For those interested in modern Chinese history, revolutionary politics, or the personalities who shaped the twentieth century, Zhou Enlai: A Life by Chen Jian is an important and highly worthwhile work. Zhou Enlai remains one of the most fascinating and elusive political figures of the modern era, admired by many as the sophisticated, pragmatic, and humane face of the Chinese Communist leadership. That reputation does not take away from the fact that Zhou was a committed cadre of the Chinese Communist Party, whose administrative skill and enormous work ethic carried the Party during some very dark times after the assumption of power in 1949. The challenge in writing about Zhou Enlai is that he has often been viewed through two sharply contrasting lenses. In the West, he has frequently been remembered as the polished diplomat who helped engineer the opening to the United States, managing the historic encounter with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger with extraordinary skill. Within China, he has often been portrayed as the loyal but moderating hand within a revolutionary system that frequently descended into ideological excess and political violence. Chen does not fully accept either simplified version, and that is to the book’s credit. Instead, he presents Zhou as a deeply committed revolutionary whose pragmatism existed not in opposition to the Communist project, but in service to it.
An enormous amount of history is compressed into Zhou’s life. His early intellectual development amid the collapse of imperial China, the revolutionary ferment of the May Fourth era, the long struggle for Communist survival, the civil war, the establishment of the People’s Republic, the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet split, the chaos of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, and ultimately the diplomatic opening to the United States all receive substantial attention. Any one of these topics could easily fill a separate volume, and Chen succeeds in showing how Zhou’s political identity evolved across these successive crises while remaining rooted in a profound loyalty to the revolutionary cause.
What makes the book especially compelling is its refusal to indulge in comforting myths. Zhou has often benefited from favorable comparisons to Mao Zedong, particularly because Mao’s catastrophic ideological campaigns make almost anyone around him appear comparatively restrained. That restraint, though well disguised, was discernible enough to get him in constant hot water at times when the Chinese Communist Party was undertaking some of Chairman Mao’s great ideological campaigns, like the Cultural Revolution. Zhou’s attempts to soften the very sharp edges of some of Mao’s undertakings were called out by many, and though in a position of power he was forced, on several occasions, to submit harsh self criticisms. He was always clever enough to stay slightly ahead of the ideological mob, and though Mao himself was the hand behind much of the Zhou criticism he realized the essential role played by “the Premier” and never let the attacks get to the point where Zhou was eliminated from government. He was, for Mao, the indispensable man.
Chen’s analysis of Zhou’s diplomatic abilities is especially strong. Zhou’s role in China’s external relations required navigating relationships with some of the most consequential figures of the twentieth century, including Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, John F. Kennedy, Nixon, and Kissinger. His performance in diplomacy was undeniably extraordinary, combining patience, tactical skill, and a clear understanding of political leverage. Very few have left such a massive legacy of achievement. With the recent trip to China just concluded by President Donald Trump many questions have arisen on the American policy towards Taiwan. Zhou, from the Chinese side, was the principal architect of the China/U.S. “understanding” on Taiwan. That alone is worth a few words. In 1960, under the guidance of Zhou:
“At a Politburo meeting in May CCP leaders decided to adopt a new policy line with the understanding that ‘it is better to put Taiwan in the hands of Chiang and his son than to allow it to be controlled by the Americans.’ They elaborated that ‘the liberation of Taiwan cannot be done in a hurry. If not by this generation, it could be done by the next generation once conditions have been gradually created and the right moment has come.’”
Chen Jian Zhou Enlai A Life pg. 460
The widely quoted dictum by Deng Xiaoping, “hide your strength, bide your time” which came much later, owes some intellectual debt to Zhou. When both the Nixon Administration and the Chinese determined that it was time for the (non) relationship to move from open hostility to mutual accommodation it was Zhou who was the chief engineer of the rapprochement, and who with Henry Kissinger devised the Shanghai Communique, dealing with not only the Taiwan issue but a whole host of issues between the countries. The communique is one of the most remarkable diplomatic efforts ever undertaken, and the finessing of the Taiwan issue by Zhou and Kissinger showed lesser diplomats how to achieve agreement even when it appears that no agreement is possible. The Taiwan finesse read:
“The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.”
The Shanghai Communique 1972
That position has never changed. Zhou and Kissinger’s formulation, while placed under stress at times, has stood the test of time.
Henry Kissinger, who dealt with so many of the giant figures of his era, had this to say about Zhou.
“In some sixty years of public life, I have encountered no more compelling figure than Zhou Enlai.”
Kissinger, Henry “On China” pg. 241.
One further anecdote from Kissinger reflects his deep respect for Zhou’s diplomatic skills. In advance of the opening to China, and before real contact had been made between the parties, Zhou engineered a visit to Beijing by Edgar Snow, a journalist with a friendly relationship with Mao. Zhou arranged for Snow to be photographed with Mao at the National Day celebration, leaving a signal for the U.S. that they might be open to a change in the relationship.
“Yet the message went unnoticed by Kissinger, who later acknowledged that the Chinese ‘overestimated our subtlety.’”
Chen Jian Zhou Enlai A Life pg. 628
The book, as mentioned, compresses an immense life central to the development of modern China into one volume. There is much more to the Zhou story than the opening to America. I have highlighted that part of his story because I am more familiar with it, but Zhou’s life story encompasses the rise of China.
For those looking for a deeper understanding of China this book is essential. It neither canonizes Zhou as the wise moderate nor condemns him as merely another authoritarian functionary. Instead, it presents a portrait of a man of remarkable discipline, intellect, and political skill who devoted those gifts to a revolutionary enterprise that produced both historic transformation and immense human suffering.
Zhou Enlai remains one of history’s most enigmatic political figures, and Chen Jian does not entirely unlock the full story. But he does provide a thoughtful, rigorous, and insightful examination of a man whose influence on modern China—and indeed on the global balance of power—was immense. A must read for serious students of history, diplomacy, and modern China.
This book, due to its length and extraordinary level of operational and strategic detail, will not be for everyone. But for those who want a serious and deeply informed understanding of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Cobra II is an essential work. Written by Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, the book provides a comprehensive account of the planning, execution, and aftermath of the Iraq War, and stands as one of the most authoritative narratives on the subject. General George Patton’s Third Army, in its World War II drive from Normandy, named the operation Cobra. Lt. General David McKiernan, the Third Army commander, decided to name the drive to Baghdad Cobra II. You can’t go wrong emulating Patton.
An enormous amount of material is covered here, from the internal debates within the administration of George W. Bush, to the Pentagon’s war planning under Donald Rumsfeld, to the execution of the “light footprint” invasion strategy that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime with remarkable speed. The authors carefully trace the evolution of the war plan, including the tension between traditional military doctrine and Rumsfeld’s push for a leaner, faster force, and the consequences of those decisions as American troops moved rapidly toward Baghdad. Equally important is the book’s examination of what was not adequately planned—the postwar occupation—which ultimately proved to be far more difficult and consequential than the invasion itself. That failure was highlighted repeatedly. Marine General Anthony Zinni had his own thoughts.
“The Jordanians and Kuwaitis, in particular, were concerned that Saddam’s days might be numbered and that Iraq might implode if he was toppled, leading to chaos on their frontier. Zinni was also concerned that Iraq could shatter and he then would be called on to restore order and keep the nation from fragmenting along ethnic lines. Containing Saddam was not the problem. It was filling a a potential power vacuum that worried him. Zinni was not eager to invade Iraq and thought the idea of arming anti-Saddam insurgents was lunacy, but if the Iraqi’s did the job themselves he had to be ready.”
Cobra II The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq Michael Gordon & General Bernard E. Trainor pg. 26
Gordon and Trainor do an excellent job of showing how the various components of the operation were interconnected. Intelligence assessments regarding weapons of mass destruction, assumptions about how Iraqi forces and civilians would react, and confidence in rapid regime collapse all fed into a strategy that achieved initial military success but left significant gaps in the transition to stability. The authors present these connections in a clear and compelling way, demonstrating how decisions made months or even years before the invasion shaped outcomes on the ground. The detail on the military aspects is pretty deep, and on this point there was a citation of a military saying that bears repeating:
“Amateurs talk about strategy, professionals talk about logistics.”
Cobra II The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq Michael Gordon & General Bernard E. Trainor pg. 96
Rumsfeld’s insistence on a “small footprint” had more than a single flaw. It created some true logistical nightmares for the real war planners. The military war planners well understood the problems with the nonsense being put forward by Rumsfeld and his team. I was a bit disappointed that the famous quote attributed to Tommy Franks in describing the intellectual ability of Doug Feith was not included in the book. Feith, despite that, still draws some heavy, well deserved criticism. A discussion of the administration plan to recruit Iraqi freedom fighters to “aid” the U.S. military turned into a total fiasco, leading to the book’s observation that:
“White House officials and CENTCOM said that the fiasco showed that Feith and his team were better at drafting conservative policy manifestos than instituting programs.”
Cobra II The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq Michael Gordon & General Bernard E. Trainor pg. 107
The book does not shy away from criticism. There is a clear-eyed assessment of the shortcomings in planning for the occupation, including the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the failure to anticipate the insurgency that followed. At the same time, the authors give due credit to the professionalism and adaptability of U.S. military commanders in the field, who executed a complex and fast-moving campaign under significant constraints. The narrative strikes a careful balance, avoiding both polemic and apology, and instead focusing on a detailed reconstruction of events and decisions.
For the student of military history and foreign policy, the cast of characters is both extensive and consequential. Figures such as Tommy Franks, Paul Wolfowitz, and Jay Garner play central roles, along with numerous others in both the military and civilian leadership. Beside the criticism of the Administration Tommy Franks did not really come off well, though I have a fondness for him, likely in part because of his accurate assessment of Feith. Franks was in a difficult position, balancing the military needs as he understood them and the ridiculous amount of interference from Rumsfeld. A military decision to omit some key military units (First Armored and First Cavalry) that Franks wanted was Rumsfeld driven, though later there would be some explanation that Franks had approved.
“‘We had First Armored and First Cavalry in the flow,’Franks said. ‘Don Rumsfeld did in fact make the decision to off-ramp the First Cavalry Division.’ Tom White, the civilian Army secretary, had a less charitable view. ‘Rumsfeld just ground Franks down,’ White said. ‘If you grind away at the military guys long enough, they will finally say, “Screw it, I’ll do the best I can with what I have.’ The nature of Rumsfeld is that you just get tired of arguing with him.’”
Cobra II The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq Michael Gordon & General Bernard E. Trainor pg. 461
The authors provide insight into their personalities, their disagreements, and their influence on the conduct of the war. As with any work of this scope, the authors are ultimately constructing a narrative that will help define how this conflict is remembered, but they do so with a level of rigor and sourcing that lends the book considerable credibility.
The Iraq War remains one of the most controversial foreign policy decisions in modern American history. Cobra II does not attempt to resolve that debate, but it does provide an indispensable foundation for understanding how and why the war unfolded as it did. For historians, policy analysts, and serious readers of contemporary history, this book is essential reading.
Last week Methuen celebrated its 300th birthday with a luncheon at the Nevins Library. It was a remarkable event that not only celebrated a great milestone but gave us a fascinating look at the rich history of the City. Thank you to the Methuen 300th Anniversary Committee for the series of events celebrating this history. The event brought together, I believe for the first time, all six Mayors of the modern era. (We greatly miss Mayor Neil Perry, who I am sure would have been delighted by the celebration) Wonderful to see everyone there.
Mayor Beauregard, former Mayors Jajuga, DiZoglio, Pollard, Manzi and Zanni.
From a letter I sent to the Eagle Tribune many years ago. I tend to put in some edits each year.
Each St. Patrick’s Day, we celebrate Irish identity—its culture, its resilience, and its history. But we don’t always reflect on the difficult decisions that helped shape modern Ireland. Few figures embody that tension more than Michael Collins, whom historian Tim Pat Coogan famously called “the man who made Ireland.”
Collins remains a controversial figure to this day. His decisions have been both praised as visionary and condemned as betrayal. That discomfort still lingers in some Irish republican circles. Yet history invites us to take a broader view. In particular, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement offers a useful lens through which to assess Collins’ legacy—and whether his most contentious decision was, in fact, the right one.
Collins’ reputation was forged during the Irish War of Independence, which began in 1919. He held multiple key roles in the Irish government, including Minister of Finance and Director of Intelligence. In the latter role, Collins built an intelligence network that successfully countered British operations while helping to develop the guerrilla tactics that defined the Irish Republican Army’s campaign. These strategies allowed a smaller, poorly equipped force to fight the world’s most powerful military to a standstill.
Central to that effort was Collins’ creation of “The Squad,” a small, highly effective unit tasked with eliminating British intelligence operatives. Their actions crippled British intelligence capabilities in Ireland while giving the Irish unprecedented insight into British plans. Collins’ contributions were so decisive that Arthur Griffith, founder of Sinn Féin, called him “the man who won the war.”
By July 1921, a truce brought an end to active hostilities, and negotiations began. The Irish position was complicated. The Easter Proclamation of 1916 had declared a fully independent republic governing the entire island. But it was increasingly clear that any agreement with Britain would fall short of that ideal.
In October 1921, Collins was sent to London as part of the Irish delegation, empowered to negotiate and sign a treaty. Notably, Éamon de Valera, the Irish President, chose not to attend, despite having led earlier negotiations. It was a decision that would have lasting and tragic consequences.
The resulting Anglo-Irish Treaty granted Ireland Dominion status within the British Empire, required an oath of allegiance to the Crown, and allowed Britain to retain control of certain ports. However, it also ended British military occupation in 26 counties and established the Irish Free State. Collins understood the compromise he was making, describing the treaty as “a stepping stone” toward full independence.
Critics then—and now—argue that the Treaty conceded too much, particularly in accepting partition and allegiance to the British monarch. Those concerns were not without merit. The Treaty split the Irish leadership, led directly to the Irish Civil War, and ultimately cost Collins his life.
Yet the longer arc of history tells a more complicated story.
Collins’ chief opponent, Éamon de Valera, eventually entered the Dáil in 1927 and took the very oath he had once rejected. Over time, he dismantled that oath and reshaped the Irish state—ironically using the political framework created by the Treaty itself. By 1948, Ireland had formally declared itself a republic. Collins’ belief that the Free State would evolve into fuller independence had been realized.
This brings us to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Like the Treaty of 1921, it required difficult compromises. It accepted that Northern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom unless a majority voted otherwise, and it amended the Irish constitution to remove its territorial claim to the North. These were not small concessions.
But the Agreement also brought an end to decades of violence and created a framework for peace that endures today.
The parallel is striking. In both 1921 and 1998, Irish leaders faced the same fundamental choice: hold fast to an ideal, or accept an imperfect settlement that could lead to something better. Collins chose the latter—and history suggests that choice was not only pragmatic, but necessary.
The evolution of the Irish Free State into a fully independent republic, along with the success of the Good Friday Agreement, underscores the foresight of Collins’ position. He recognized earlier than most that progress would come not in a single leap, but in stages.
Collins did not deliver the Ireland many had envisioned in 1921. But he made possible the Ireland that exists today—sovereign, stable, and at peace.
That may be the truest measure of leadership, and the most fitting legacy to remember each St. Patrick’s Day.
Congressman Chris Pappas visited Seabrook to present a Purple Heart to the Saracy family for Pat. Daniel E. Janvrin Jr. of Seabrook, who was a combat infrantyman for the Army in the Second World War. Daniel enlisted in October of 1943 and served until he was killed in action on November 12, 1944 at the age of 19.
Thank you to Congressman Pappas and State Representative Matt Sabourin Dit Choinière, who worked very hard to make this happen.
Rise and Kill First is a gripping investigative history that examines Israel’s long-standing policy of targeted assassinations against enemies both near and far. Although I read this book a while back it is very topical today. Journalist Ronen Bergman spent years interviewing intelligence officials, military leaders, and political figures from the Israeli intelligence agencies and the military. The book is from 2018 but despite the age brings us valuable insights into how Israeli intelligence works, how it grew into what it is today, with an emphasis on operations designed to kill those who believed that acts of terror conducted against the State of Israel would go unanswered. The book shows that Israel has conducted more targeted assassinations than any other country in modern history, using covert operations to eliminate threats ranging from terrorists, militant leaders and yes even nuclear scientists. The author does not gloss over some of the very big mistakes that Israeli intelligence has made over the years, but there are also many very notable successes.
The title comes from an ancient Jewish teaching:
“If someone comes to kill you, rise and kill him first.”
This phrase becomes the guiding philosophy behind Israel’s security strategy.
This is a book on Israeli intelligence and operations to eliminate enemies permanently. No book dealing with any facet of the Israeli state can ignore the founding of Israel, and the immediate and continual efforts by the neighboring Arab nations to eliminate the Israeli state. Whether or not you agree with the Israeli methodology the immediate, and continual threat they faced, was existential. Their response to this threat was often times pre-emptive in striking their enemies, and in other cases simply visiting retribution upon those who had committed heinous acts. The book covers the neighborhood hostility, and sets the stage for Israeli intelligence hitting back in a very tough way. Israeli intelligence is known to be amongst the very best in the world. In my view they are at the very top of that ranking, and their record proves it. I have always felt this way, but I had no idea that it was Israeli intelligence that secured a copy of the Nikita Khrushchev anti-Stalin speech after Stalin’s death. The release of the speech caused the Soviets untold problems in the communist bloc, especially with China.
Even though the book is from 2018 there is a constancy to the ongoing issues in the Middle East. What Israeli intelligence operations were covered? • Assassination campaigns against the leaders of groups Hamas and Hezbollah. • Operations to sabotage the Iranian nuclear program. • The intelligence wars that operated as a major feature of the many armed conflicts in the region. • Israeli retaliation operations after the Munich Massacre during the 1972 Summer Olympics.
You do not need to watch James Bond movies if you are interested in espionage. Israeli intelligence is the real deal, and that includes some cutting edge tools of spy craft. The book provides detailed accounts of covert missions across the Middle East and Europe, showing how intelligence networks, surveillance and undercover agents operate in real-world espionage.
Despite the book being Israeli sourced the author does not shy away from some of the notable failures by the Israelis. It is balanced in its way, One of the notable failures covered, amongst the many successes, was the attempted poisoning of Khaled Mashal in Jordan. This is one of the book’s most jaw-dropping episodes because it was both audacious and badly botched. Israeli agents tried to kill Hamas leader Khaled Mashal in Amman using poison, but the operation unraveled, agents were caught, and Israel had to provide the antidote under intense pressure from Jordan. It reads like a thriller, but Bergman treats it as a case study in hubris.
The saying that “the more things change the more they stay the same” comes to mind. The Hamas-Israeli war is not new.
This book is highly recommended, especially in light of the current conflagration in the Middle East. Understanding the history involved in the Middle East helps us all to look at current events with a clearer view of how we arrived at this point.
Stuart Eizenstat’s President Carter: The White House Years offers a detailed and reflective insider account of Jimmy Carter’s presidency, written by one of the administration’s most senior advisers. Serving as Carter’s domestic policy advisor, Eizenstat brings both proximity and perspective to a presidency often remembered more for its difficulties than its achievements. Eizenstat makes clear from the outset that his purpose is not hagiography but explanation. He is very frank about the Carter shortcomings, and was not afraid to get very specific about those shortcomings. He tries to balance the negative with some of the very positive things that came out of the administration. The book traces Carter’s term from 1977 to 1981, blending personal recollection with documentary evidence drawn from memoranda, meeting notes, and later interviews.
Eizenstat repeatedly emphasizes that Carter approached the presidency as an engineer and problem-solver rather than a politician. Reflecting on this tendency, Eizenstat observes that Carter believed if the facts were clear and the policy sound, political support would follow, an assumption that often proved false in practice. Eizenstat lays out one of the problems, as he saw it, early in the book:
“It is impossible to govern without co-opting major institutions and their leaders to support a president’s agenda and stand behind him in tough times. … he must reach accommodation with the organized groups inside the Beltway who too often call the shots via access to their deep congressional connections and carefully targeted campaign contributions.” President Carter: The White House Years, Eizenstat, Stuart pg. 41-42
Carter, due to his inherent stubbornness, amongst other traits, failed to discern this truth, and alienated key constituencies while doing what he believed to be the right thing. Carter also started, from an administrative perspective, on what most would consider the wrong foot. He came into the Presidency with the idea that he could do without a Chief of Staff, utilizing the “spokes of the wheel” methodology putting himself at the center of multiple “report to” staffers. Eizenstat, and most observers of presidential administration, see it as a recipe for disorganization. President Ford had tried it initially, and quickly abandoned it. With the Carter folks coming in Dick Cheney, a Chief of Staff to President Ford, left Hamilton Jordan a gift, a bicycle wheel with mangled spokes, with the warning, “beware the spokes of the wheel.” (See the Chris Whipple book “The Gatekeepers: How the White House Chiefs of Staff Define Every Presidency” for a very good take on the spokes of the wheel)
Eizenstat is frank about the internal strains within the White House, and how those strains led to policy ambivalence, and maybe even policy confusion. The very stark differences between national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance were problematic, which is acknowledged and highlighted by the author. Once again Eizenstat paints a picture of the administration having conflicting, maybe muddled, messaging in this key portfolio. Like many books dealing with U.S. foreign policy in this era Henry Kissinger manages to get a lot of mention, even though he did not serve in the Administration. I would say that Eizenstat recognizes that some of Carter’s foreign policy preferences were a negative reaction to Kissinger’s conduct of policy under Nixon/Ford.
“From his first days in office Carter abandoned Kissinger’s incremental path of successive disengagements to seek sweeping, comprehensive peace agreements between Israel and all its hostile neighbors, and he revived the idea of the Geneva peace conference. It was almost a utopian program.”
President Carter: The White House Years, Eizenstat, Stuart pg. 416
I am confident that Kissinger was horrified at the approach, as utopia was never his goal. Kissinger had paid nominal lip service to the Geneva process co-chaired with the U.S.S.R, but in reality had worked assiduously to marginalize the Soviet Union in the Middle East, quite successfully. ( See Martin Indyk, “Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy” for a great read on Kissinger’s Middle East shuttle diplomacy.)
Eizenstat, of course, covers the major foreign policy success of President Carter, the Camp David Accords, which brought a negotiated peace and diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt. But out of that success grew major disappointment for Carter, who could never move the Israeli side as far as he would have liked, leading to a poisoning of relations between him and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. That poisoning ultimately led to a major loss of support for Carter from the Jewish electorate in America. Eizenstat agonizes over this split in the book, and he highlights his own attempts to heal the breach.
The book is especially strong in explaining how Carter’s governing philosophy collided with Washington realities. Eizenstat writes that the administration entered office believing it could restore honesty and competence to government, yet soon found itself navigating inflation, energy shortages, and international crises that resisted technocratic solutions. Eizenstat acknowledges Carter’s insistence on reading every document that hit his desk, including long policy papers, and how this attention to minutiae burnt valuable time and prevented the Administration from governing on a broader message. Hamilton Jordan wrote Carter a 116 page memo on issues facing the Administration in which he said:
“You find it difficult-if not impossible-to say that ‘this problem is not important enough to merit my personal attention.’ As a result, too many policies, programs and issues receive what I describe as excessive Presidential attention and absorb too much of the precious political and moral capital of your Presidency.”
President Carter: The White House Years, Eizenstat, Stuart pg. 482
Carter also had difficulty with Congress that, while not entirely his fault, hampered his ability to get things done. Much of the dysfunction involved in that relationship is acknowledged to be the fault of the Administration, and of Carter personally. His attack on Congressional water projects, pork to him but politically vital for members of Congress many from his own party, started the relationship on a sour note. While it had its up and downs Carter was never really comfortable as a back-slapping pol. He preferred position papers. While not directly connected the eventual rupture with Ted Kennedy, flowed out of some of these Carter personality traits. While he did indeed beat Kennedy in the Democratic race in 1980 he was wounded, and never fully recovered. The author, as you might expect, was careful in his description of the Kennedy challenge, but I got the sense that he was deeply disillusioned with the Kennedy actions.
Eizenstat devotes considerable attention to Carter’s energy policy, which he characterizes as both prescient and politically costly. He notes that Carter warned Americans that the era of cheap energy was over, a message that was unpopular at the time but increasingly validated in later decades. Similarly, Eizenstat presents the Camp David Accords as evidence of Carter’s persistence, describing the negotiations as a process that required patience, moral conviction, and an unusual willingness to invest personal time.
Throughout the book, Eizenstat challenges the notion that Carter’s presidency lacked accomplishment. He argues instead that many of Carter’s initiatives — on human rights, deregulation, and environmental protection — reshaped the policy landscape long after he left office. The author reminds us several times that it was Jimmy Carter who appointed Paul Volcker to the Fed, something that many have forgotten.
President Carter: The White House Years is a thoughtful, richly detailed reassessment of a presidency that remains widely misunderstood. Through measured analysis and firsthand experience, Eizenstat offers a portrait of Jimmy Carter as a serious, principled leader whose ambitions were often ahead of their time. The book reminds readers that political success and historical significance are not always synonymous.
For students of American government and readers interested in presidential leadership, Eizenstat’s account provides a nuanced and valuable contribution to the literature.
Methuen Mayor David (D.J.) Beauregard was inaugurated for his first full term of office on January 2, 2026. Mayor Beauregard had been selected, from the City Council ranks, to replace Mayor Neil Perry, who passed away before the expiration of his term. Mayor Beauregard defeated James Sarcione in order to fill the balance of Mayor Perry’s term, and with in the latest cycle defeated newcomer Barbara Stoebel to win a full term in his own right.
Mayor Beauregard was sworn in, with the newly elected City Council, School Committee, Greater Lawrence Regional Vocational School Committee, Nevins Library Trustees and the Methuen Housing Authority elected Commissioners. Congratulations to all of Methuen’s newly elected officials.
Mayor Beauregard is Methuen’s seventh Mayor of the modern era, following the Charter change that brought us the mayoral form of government in 1993. Methuen changed to a Town Administrator/Council form in 1973 and then a Town Manager/Council form after abandoning Town Meeting. After the 1993 change Methuen had its first mayoral election since Samuel Rushton won the office before 1920. Mayors, by Charter, are limited to three two year terms. Let us take a look at the inaugurals of the six Mayors that preceded Mayor Beauregard.
In 1994 Dennis DiZoglio led the ticket in the very large primary field, and then defeated a young upstart City Councilor named William Manzi in the final election to become Methuen’s first Mayor of the modern era. Mayor DiZoglio won three terms as Mayor, and during his tenure the school system built the three K-8 grammar schools (Marsh, Tenney, and the Timony schools.)
Mayor DiZoglio sworn in by Town Clerk James Maloney. Mayor DiZoglio gives his Inaugural address.
Mayor Sharon Pollard won the first of her three terms by defeating City Councilor Larry Giordano in her first run for that office. Mayor Pollard was a former State Senator, and a former Secretary of Energy for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, working for Governor Dukakis. A little remembered fact is that then City Councilor Steve Zanni was in that preliminary election for Mayor.
Mayor Pollard posing with the Manzi family at her Inaugural
Following Mayor Pollard was Mayor William Manzi III. (Yes, the same one that lost to Mayor DiZoglio.) In my initial race I defeated Ellen Bahan for the office. In 2006 I was sworn in by none other than James P. Jajuga, outfitted in a regal set of Justice of the Peace robes. I also served three terms, and was very happy to secure the state financing for the High School project, and get that construction started.
Speaking to the crowd at the Tenney School in 2006.
Mayor Stephen Zanni was the fourth Mayor of the modern era. Mayor Zanni defeated Al Dinuccio in 2011, and twice won re-election. During his Administration the total renovation of Nicholson Stadium, including brand new artificial turf, occurred.
Mayor Zanni sworn in by City Clerk Tina Touma-Conway.The Four Mayors of the modern era pose at the Inaugural of Mayor Zanni in January of 2012.
James P. Jajuga was Methuen’s fifth Mayor of the modern era, and won election in 2017 while running unopposed. Mayor Jajuga is a former State Senator, has served as the Massachusetts Secretary of Public Safety, as well as having a long and distinguished career as a Massachusetts State Trooper. Mayor Jajuga served one term as the Mayor of Methuen.
Mayor Jajuga is Sworn in as Methuen’s Fifth Mayor of the Modern Era. The Five Mayors of the modern era pose at Mayor Jajuga’s Inaugural
Mayor Neil Perry was elected to his third terms in office and sworn in on January 3, 2024. Mayor Perry stabilized Methuen’s finances and guided the City through some of the very difficult aspects of COVID. State oversight of Methuen’s finances ended on his watch. Mayor Perry passed away while in office.
Mayor Perry Sworn InThree Mayors. Mayor Neil Perry with former Mayors William Manzi III and Dennis DiZoglio
Anderson has provided a very important history of the run-up to the fall of the Shah and the onset of the Iranian revolution, with a history of U.S. involvement in Iran going back to World War 2. If you are wondering how the United States made such a mess out of the relationship with Iran this is the book for you. For those without a lot of knowledge of this history you may be amazed at how many missteps, blunders, and general mistakes were made by the diplomats working for the U.S. on the “Iran desk” as the end of the regime came closer.
The American diplomatic incompetence on Iran was not just attributable to one or two powerful officials in a position to push an incorrect line, but was deeply ingrained in the entire bureaucracy, with small exception. An aversion to upsetting the prevailing group think, and a strong attachment to the Shah simply blinded key policy makers from some fairly discernible truths. Amazingly, when the Shah was teetering, and after he fell, there were some in the U.S. that painted Ayatollah Khomeini as a viable alternative, misreading the very plain signals that Khomeini had put out while in exile. We are still paying the price for this incompetence.
The Shah of Iran came to power after a U.S. supported coup in 1953 overthrew Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh. This coup has been the source of much Iranian outrage over the years and decades, and a powerful source of anti-Shah propaganda while he was in power. The Shah started as a “tool of the Americans” in many Iranian minds and in the end that is where he ended up.
Anderson gives us all the history but really focuses on the run-up to the Shah losing power in Iran, and how both the Shah and the U.S. State Department just did not have a grip on the realities on the ground in Iran as the political upheaval began. Not all of the State Department personnel on the Iran desk were incompetent, but the major players were. The American failures went right up the line to the national security team in the White House headed by Zbigniew Brzezinski. The failures were not limited to the diplomatic corps. On the first page of the book Anderson gives us a CIA assessment of Iran’s political future.
“The Shah will be an active participant in Iranian life well into the 1980’s…There will be no radical change in Iranian political behavior in the near future.” -secret CIA report “Iran in the 1980’s,” August 1977, five months before the start of the revolution.”
Anderson, Scott King of Kings The Iranian Revolution: A Story of Hubris, Delusion and Catastrophic Miscalculation. Preface Page 1 The strength of the book lies, in my view, in the separate tracks Anderson gives us a clear eyed view of. The tracks are:
1. The governing activities of the Shah, and the delusion which propelled his actions, or lack thereof. 2. The diplomatic failures of the American government, which were both wide and deep. 3. The Khomeini revolution and how it managed to succeed, and how the Ayatollah managed to somewhat cloak his true intentions, and essentially jettison some of the initial “moderates” that provided him political support while he was in exile. Deeply connected to items 1 and 2.
Lets look at the diplomatic failures of the U.S. which were so pervasive that they can be fairly described as embarrassing. The type of failures involved here would, in my view, become symptomatic of future U.S. diplomatic disasters, like Iraq. Different players, same characteristics. The Administration sets a diplomatic marker and seeks to carry it forward regardless of facts on the ground, and treating anyone who had a different point of view as someone to be marginalized.
“Going all the way back to the 1940’s, the shah became incensed whenever he learned foreign diplomats were talking with those he considered his competitors or opposition. As U.S.-Iranian relations grew steadily closer, so did the desire of successive American ambassadors to stay on His Majesty’s good side, and the more they discouraged their underlings from consorting with malcontents or pursuing the sorts of critical fact-gathering forays known to upset him.
Anderson, Scott King of Kings The Iranian Revolution: A Story of Hubris, Delusion and Catastrophic Miscalculation. Page 85
The U.S. embassy had a lack of Farsi speakers, and as noted above a desire to put the best face on the delusional beliefs of the Shah. The U.S. embassy did not have enough Farsi speakers? One of those Farsi speakers, an American diplomat Michael Metrinko, reported on severe unrest in the countryside that did not comport with the line put forward by the Shah’s government. Metrinko’s analysis was given short shrift by the U.S. Ambassador, and relegated to a a diplomatic pouch that was not read in Washington. Gary Sick was another whose counsel was marginalized. The Carter Administration had, across the Board, severe divisions on foreign policy. In this case the top echelons essentially took their eye off the ball and relied on the representations of the Iran desk and the Embassy. That was a fatal mistake.
The Shah, for all his reputation as an autocrat, simply did not have the personal strength to deal with difficult issues, even those not related to his eventual overthrow. Brzezinski believed that the Shah should have suppressed the Khomeini revolution with the military. His indecisive nature had always been problematic, but when faced with the tidal wave of the Khomeini movement he just froze. American misjudgment as to what Khomeini represented contributed to the chaos, but the Shah, living in his own world, could not devise any workable solution. The American lack of understanding of the true nature of Khomeini was inexplicable. Khomeini had, as part of his ongoing propaganda effort, distributed throughout Iran fiery anti-Shah sermons on cassettes. These cassettes gave some clue as the the true goals of the Ayatollah, but they were never translated by the American side.
Khomeini’s usage, and eventual jettisoning of the moderate elements of the movement, is a fascinating look at how it was not just the U.S. government that was fooled by the Ayatollah. Prominent early supporters, even government ministers, eventually fell as the regime radicalized. Maybe if we translated a few cassettes the surprise would not have been as big.
If the American diplomatic effort was not so awful could the Shah’s regime have been saved? That is hard to say with any degree of certainty. The Shah himself may have been beyond saving due to his own high level of detachment. The Carter Administration has taken a lot of criticism over the years, and in this case much of it is deserved. The final indignity, of the U.S. embassy being overrun and American diplomats being held hostage, was precipitated by the total mishandling of the admission of the Shah to the United States by the Carter Administration. Carter himself, in initially refusing the Shah entry, understood the dangers of admittance. When the Shah’s medical condition, after leaving Iran, took a turn for the worse, President Carter, under significant pressure, was moving to reversing himself and allowing the Shah to enter the U.S. he asked his staff, some of whom were advocates for the Shah being allowed in:
“What are you guys going to advise me to do if they overrun our embassy and take our people hostage?”
Anderson, Scott King of Kings The Iranian Revolution: A Story of Hubris, Delusion and Catastrophic Miscalculation. Page 396
Despite that worry the Shah was admitted without any withdrawal of U.S. personnel from Iran. Another major mistake, and one that helped to doom the Carter re-election effort.
If you have any interest in how the Iranian revolution came to be, and how the U.S. managed to bungle the diplomacy involved, this book is outstanding and a must read.
Bill Manzi.com 